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Abstract: This paper refers to the gap between the liberal rhetoric and the reality of
contemporary international relations. It maintains that liberalism remains a leading ex-
planatory perspective, yet contemporary international affairs are too dynamic and too
complicated to analyse them within liberal perspectives alone. In addition, liberalism
tends to fall into dogmatism. Thus, the adequate analysis of today’s democracy, as well
as the political and economic aspects of contemporary international relations becomes
incomplete without a reference to some realist, constructivist and even postmodernist
conclusions. The example of the East-Central European democratic transformation
clearly illustrates this thesis. The liberal reforms in the region still clash with the illib-
eral attitudes inherited from the communist past. Additionally, liberal values are mis-
conceived and misunderstood. The explanation of those processes reaches far beyond
liberal confines, and even the analysis of the Eastern enlargement of the European Un-
ion would be more complete with some realist, critical theoretical or postmodernist re-
marks added to it.
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Introduction
T
he fall of the bipolar order marked a symbolic victory of liberalism in
the inter-paradigmatic debate in international relations during the
1980s. The liberal claims about the power of democracy, the role of eco-
nomic interdependencies or the strength of international regimes became
more attractive than the static and power-oriented vision of structural real-
ists (Smith, 1999, p. 106–107). Nevertheless, the dynamic evolution of in-
ternational relations at the beginning of the 21st century has contributed to
the complexity and unpredictability of international processes in both po-
litical and economic sense. Liberalism remains the key theoretical per-
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spective to analyse the problem of today’s world. Yet liberal explanations
become incomplete and some previous optimistic claims about the domi-
nation of the liberal logic of international affairs after the end of the cold
war sound a bit exaggerated (Fukuyama, 1989, pp. 3–18). Without some
realist, constructivist, critical theoretical or even postmodernist conclu-
sions the full picture of the complex socio-political reality of contempo-
rary international relations will be impossible.
Besides, liberalism tends to fall into dogmatism. The complex charac-
ter of today’s world illustrates a growing gap between the liberal rhetoric
and the more dynamic reality of international political and economic af-
fairs. The case of East-Central European transformation is a good example
in this regard. Liberal philosophy and liberal values have considerably
contributed to democratic reforms in the region. Yet in many instances
they are misconceived or misunderstood and the liberal slogans serve to
cover the limited effectiveness of East-Central European political elites.
Liberal creativity still meets some illiberal tendencies among the East-
-Central European societies and a pure liberal perspective of analysis will
not reveal the complex reality of the region.
The aim of this article is to indicate the gap between the liberal rhetoric
and the socio-political reality of today’s world. The first part of the text re-
fers to some general conclusions about the problems of contemporary de-
mocracy, international political and economic relations. The second refers
to the clash of liberal values and the specific socio-political reality of
East-Central Europe. Finally the article refers to the Eastern enlargement
of the European Union and the political reality of the enlarged EU. The ex-
ample of the East-Central European democratic transformation illustrates
that the liberal perspective remains the leading theoretical approach yet
the full and adequate picture of contemporary international relations must
reach beyond the liberal confines and absorb some realist, constructivist
and even postmodernist insights. The liberal perspective alone will be in-
complete and sometimes misleading.
The liberal assumptions and the reality of the world affairs
after the fall of the bipolar order
The fall of the bipolar order has proved the adequacy of the fundamen-
tal liberal assumptions. Liberalism remains the most inspiring perspective
for the analysis of the post cold war international relations. Yet its domina-
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tion is certainly not as unambiguous as at the beginning of the 1990s. The
liberal slogans meet much more complex international reality today and
the full picture of the international affairs reaches beyond the liberal confines.
This becomes true in both international relations and domestic politics.
In the case of domestic politics liberalism emphasizes the role of de-
mocracy as a guarantee of a just social order, the power of people and
socio-political stability. The liberals are right that effective democracy en-
sures just social order and mitigates the excessive ambitions of political
elites. It helps to keep the domestic and international peace (Russett, 2010,
p. 102–103). The liberal thesis that democracies do not fight each other be-
cause of the power of people that limits the aggressive policy of the ruling
elites has for a long time been a challenge for the realists. Yet even the lib-
erals tend to fall into simplifications today. The liberal perspective misses
the evolution of democracy towards a more populist order based on the
mechanisms of political propaganda and socio-technical instruments. The
real political competition becomes in this regard limited to short periods
before the elections and, even then, refer more to some propaganda slo-
gans than serious political programs. Besides, as postmodernists would
emphasize, politics becomes today less a case of the Aristotelian activity
for citizens and community. It is more a competition over the dominant
vision of truth or, as Richard Devetak notes, “the struggle to impose au-
thoritative interpretations” of social and political events, to include inter-
national relations” (Devetak, 2005, p. 167).
Discussing the state of American democracy Hans J. Morgenthau indi-
cated in the 1960s some real and more general problems of democratic or-
der. They revolved around the arrogance and alienation of governing
elites, the concentration of economic power as well as the social trends of
conformism and excessive consumerism (Morgenthau, 1960, p. 244–245,
251). The most important, however, was the tendency among the ruling
elites to limit the public debate and to ignore the voice of minority
(Morgenthau, 1960, p. 262–263, 311–312; Williams, 2005, p. 113–114).
He noted that “The majority, as long as it lasts, tends to become the abso-
lute master, the tyrant, of the body politic, stifling in that body the vital
spirit of questioning and initiative, and evoking instead the submissive-
ness of conformity” (Morgenthau, 1960, p. 250). Today this last tendency
becomes even more dangerous, especially for unconsolidated democra-
cies, to include the countries of East-Central Europe. The problems of
weak East-Central European mechanisms of civil society and weak social
control over the political class contribute to the tendency among the gov-
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erning elites in the region to replace the real political debate with some PR
tricks and electoral promises that will never be fulfilled (Morgenthau,
1947, p. 53–54; Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 126–130). Besides, the liberal
slogans have usually served here to mask the limited effectiveness of po-
litical elites. This is, for example, the case of the liberal principle of
free-market and free competition. Misconceived, or perceived in dog-
matic terms, both have for a long time served to justify the problems with
regulative functions of some East-Central European states.
Furthermore, the liberals tend to miss that some democratic institu-
tions and mechanisms may have a declarative and façade character, espe-
cially in the case of the countries in transition. They seem to forget that
building a democratic order is a long and difficult process and any single
democratic elections (or a single law following international standards)
may not testify to the democratic character of the entire political system.
The studies of democratic transformation after the end of the cold war, to
include the works of Guillermo O’Donnell on some countries of Latin
America (O’Donnell, 1996, p. 34–37), illustrate the existence of the
so-called declarative democracy. It is the order that remains democratic in
formal terms. It refers to democratic institutions, mechanisms and law that
are in formal compliance with democratic standards. In practice, however,
those institutions hardly function and serve as a facade for much deeper
and (sometimes) less democratic processes.
Thus, it seems difficult to analyse the evolution of the democratic order
from the liberal position alone. The liberal perspective of contemporary
democratic processes should be supplemented by some realist, construct-
ivist and even postmodernist remarks. They are necessary to adequately
reflect the socio-political reality of the today’s world and they may protect
the liberals from falling into dogmatism.
In the case of international economic relations liberalism emphasizes
globalisation and economic interdependencies. It correctly points out that
closer economic ties among the members of the international community
prevent conflicts and the worst emanations of the power politics. They sta-
bilize international relations and make them more predictable (Burchill,
2005, p. 62–64). Nevertheless, liberalism tends to forget about inequali-
ties among the countries on the international scene. The liberals miss that
globalization does not mean equal opportunities for all participants of this
process. This is not only the case of theoretical debates between the liber-
als and the globalists about the most developed core of globalization as
well as much less competitive semi-periphery and periphery of the world
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economic processes (Wallerstein, 1996, p. 87–92). It is the case of the real
domination of the most powerful international actors in economic, finan-
cial and technological aspects of this process and the real difficulties to
compete on the global market for much less developed states (Stiglitz,
2004, p. 25–26).
Liberalism underestimates that globalization facilitates the concentra-
tion of economic benefits in a limited number of participants and usually
the most powerful ones. They are at the core of the global economic pro-
cesses and benefit from the growing international dependencies most. The
countries of the periphery (and most of the semi-peripheral states) benefit
from the globalization in a limited way or do not derive any benefits at all.
Yet they share the same risks of global crises and turbulences. Hence, the
reality of international economic relations departs from the liberal view of
common benefits and the liberal assumptions about the harmonizing role
of economic interdependencies. They may exert positive influence on
contemporary international affairs yet their assessment may not be as pos-
itive as the liberals claim. The problem is certainly a bit more complicated
and it would be difficult to adequately explain it without supplementary
references to some conclusions of the realists and the globalists.
In the case of international political relations liberalism correctly em-
phasizes the stabilizing role of international law and international regimes
(Burchill, 2005, p. 59–60). Yet it ignores the tendency among the most
powerful members of the international community to use the international
law instrumentally (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 217–219). It underestimates the
role of national interests as a driving force of contemporary international
relations, despite the domination of the liberal rhetoric in the post cold-war
world. The international law and international institutions play a crucial
role in stabilizing the post cold-war order yet they are prone to the game of
conflicting national interests. This game has so far accompanied not only
the most controversial issues discussed in the frame of the United Nations
(as the examples of the wars in Iraq or Syria illustrate) but also the flagship
institutions of the liberal order, to include the European Union.
In fact, most of the cold-war period world political institutions tend to
take on the character of the façade masking the game of national interests
today and the real political dialogue shifts towards more flexible and less
institutionalized platforms – pragmatic and less dogmatic in ideological
terms. Besides, the example of Russia and its foreign policy illustrates that
some powerful actors on the international scene reject the liberal identity
and liberal philosophy at all (Oliker, Crane et al., 2009, p. 9–16). Here,
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again, liberalism may not be convincing enough to analyse the power-re-
lated aspects of contemporary international relations and the liberal expla-
nations need some supplementary realist considerations.
The gap between the liberal rhetoric and the socio-political reality
– the case of democratic transformation
in East-Central Europe
The gap between the liberal slogans and more complex social reality
becomes clear in the case of East-Central European states and their demo-
cratic transformation. The liberal perspective is important to analyse the
democratic processes in the region yet it is hardly able to reveal all compli-
cated questions of social identities there. The liberals face some serious
challenges to adequately reflect the game between the social passivity in-
herited from the communist past and the creativity strengthened by the
new liberal order.
Indeed, the communist period caused the changes in the peoples’ men-
tality. The empty communist slogans about the social justice, combined
with the brutal and oppressive character of the communist system, con-
tributed to social passivity. The scarcity of basic goods and pervasive pov-
erty focused the activity of people on the problems of everyday life. Yet
the rhetoric of the power of the working class contributed to expectations
of social privileges among many professional groups. In the same vein, the
control of the state over the distribution of goods strengthened the de-
manding attitudes among some segments of the society. They have ex-
pected further distributive and protecting role of the state even after the
fall of the communist order (Vanhuysse, 2006, p. 13–15).
The collapse of the communist system did not automatically change
the mentality of post-communist societies. The last 25 years of democratic
transformation in East-Central Europe illustrate the clash of the liberal dy-
namism and creativity and the legacy of the communist past deeply rooted
in the social attitudes of East-Central European societies. The scale of the
problem differs yet it practically touches every country in the region and
Robert Brier is right when he notes that “The actors who shape the
post-communist condition bring with them the notions, ideas, and identi-
ties they acquired under communist rule” (Brier, 2010, p. 154).
The new, liberal-oriented, economic reforms entailed high social costs,
to include the growing unemployment, the loss of the previous privileges
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by professional groups and the process of dismantling of the large commu-
nist-period industrial plants (Vanhuysse, 2006, p. 9–10; Jackson, Klich,
Poznañska, 2005, p. 98). Hence, the reception of the liberal rhetoric ac-
companying the reforms has largely departed from the picture of success-
ful liberal transformation (Galasiñska, Galasiñski, 2010, p. 2, 12). On the
contrary, David Ost identifies some “tendencies for political illiberalism”
in East-Central Europe, to include populism, demanding attitudes and dif-
ficulties of many social and professional groups to define their interests
(Ost, 1993, p. 454). Besides, the transformation has, at least at its first
stage, marked the strong influence of the previous communist elites
– more interested in their own particular aims than the stable liberal order.
(Stachura, 1999, p. 137; Cox, 2003, p. 234, 241–243).
Furthermore, the new liberal slogans, to include those about the value
of personal career or the stimulating role of competitiveness, become mis-
conceived or misunderstood at all. The clash of the communist past with
the new liberal rhetoric has resulted in different and sometimes distorted
patterns of social behaviour. Hence, the entrepreneurship of the younger
generation has contrasted growing disappointment with the new liberal or-
der among the older generation. The aims of personal career meet the “rat
race” and “wild competition” on the labour market. The misconceived lib-
eral value of personal wealth has resulted in the struggle for money and the
lack of respect for those weaker and poorer. They break the previous tradi-
tional social ties. All in all the social backgrounds of East-Central Euro-
pean transformation seems more the case of constructivist research and
conclusions than pure liberal studies.
The political evolution of East-Central European states confirms the
progress of their democratic transformation. Yet the political systems of
many countries in the region remain far from consolidation (Rupnik,
2007, p. 17). The transformation is accompanied by weak state institutions
and underdeveloped civic society as well as weak institutions of public ac-
countability hardly able to ensure the responsibility of political elites to
the people (Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 24–26, 126–127). O’Donnell re-
marks about the declarative character of democracy (O’Donnell, 1996,
p. 34–37) may sound a bit exaggerated for East-Central Europe yet even in
this region the permanent political debates are replaced by populist prom-
ises right before the elections and some PR tricks. They serve the governing
elites to cover their limited effectiveness. The law remains overregulated,
incoherent and too complicated to be understood by ordinary people
(Winiecki, 1997, p. 3–4, 12). The bureaucracies of East-Central Europe
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are still affected by a culture of patronage (Jablonski, 2000, p. 136) and
some new examples of economic and political scandals cause social anger
and apathy.
This picture is certainly far from a few general liberal assumptions.
Liberalism and the liberal emphasis on the stabilizing role of democracy
remain important in the analysis of the transformation in the region. Yet
the portrayal of East-Central Europe is much more complicated and it is
impossible to close it in the liberal frames. Without some constructivist or
realist conclusions the adequate understanding of social and political pro-
cesses there becomes difficult. Besides, liberalism tends to fall into dog-
matism in East-Central Europe. It refers to liberal slogans but misses some
serious socio-political processes in the region that contradict the liberal
foundations. This is not only the problem of illiberal attitudes or the dis-
torted picture of liberalism among the people in East-Central Europe. This
is a more dangerous question of populism that grows and attracts more at-
tention in the region.
Indeed, as Daniel Smilov and Ivan Krastev indicate, populism re-
mains a clear tendency accompanying the evolution of the social identi-
ties in the post-communist states. (Smilov, Krastev, 2008, p. 7). Besides,
the recent elections to the European Parliament confirm that populism in
Europe is the tendency not limited to the East-Central part of the conti-
nent (Higgins, 2014). The populists criticize the ineffectiveness of the
current political elites and the social costs of the reforms but simulta-
neously the liberal philosophy of transformation and liberal democratic
values (Smilov, Krastev, 2008, p. 7). In practice, they propose nothing
but the empty slogans and promises yet they exploit peoples’ disappoint-
ment with the liberal reforms and uncertainty. They attract the attention
of those who felt marginalized and excluded by the liberal transforma-
tion. The problem is, however, that the populist slogans in the socio-po-
litical reality of East-Central Europe are likely to prevail over the liberal
rhetoric, especially in the case of further economic problems and insta-
bility of the whole continent.
This growing danger of populism (not only in East-Central Europe)
needs much deeper and comprehensive analysis than the liberal perspec-
tive alone. Its explanations should absorb the conclusions proposed by
the realists and the constructivists. Some postmodernist remarks about
the politics in the region that becomes the rivalry over the interpretations
of the post cold-war transformation sound quite right in this regard as
well.
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The liberal rhetoric and the Eastern enlargement
of the European Union
The case of East-Central Europe, serving as the example of the gap be-
tween the liberal slogans and the dynamic reality of contemporary interna-
tional relations, returns in the process of the Eastern enlargement of the
European Union and the political practices in the enlarged EU. The liberal
arguments accompanying the accession of the countries from the region
have usually emphasized the strengthening of the European values and the
contribution to the sense of the European community. Those arguments re-
main valid, important and true. Yet, again, the reference to liberal values
alone does not explain the entire picture of the problem. The course of the
European integration after the fall of the bipolar order has always been
a complex phenomenon reaching beyond the liberal explanations. Be-
sides, it has never been a purely economic process but a result of more
complicated political, social and economic decisions. The single Euro-
pean currency is a good illustration in this regard as the introduction of the
Euro was accompanied by strong political and realist considerations that
accompanied the liberal and economic arguments (Erlanger, 2011).
Considering the Eastern enlargement of the European Union the liber-
als rightly argue that it has strengthened the democratic processes in the
region. They correctly emphasize the extension of the zone of stability and
predictability to the East. Finally they are right when they indicate that the
enlarged EU changes the character of political relations in East-Central
Europe and introduces new standards of political dialogue. Nevertheless,
the liberal perspective misses or underestimates some specific aspects of
the enlargement process and the current state of the European integration.
The aspects that realists, critical theorists or even postmodernists will ex-
plain better.
First, the realists will indicate a deep divergence of power between the
old and the new members of the European Union. Despite the progress in
the economic development of the new member states this difference will
remain a source of potential problems that may seriously affect the politi-
cal relations within the EU. The most obvious in this regard is the case of
immigration and the complaints of the reach EU countries about the mas-
sive influx of workers from the new member states. The new members, for
their part, raise the issue of their limited ability to influence the real deci-
sion making in the European Union. They point out a tendency among the
wealthiest European societies to consider the East-Central Europeans as
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the EU citizens of the second category or a “reservoir” of the cheap
workforce. Thus, the complaints of both sides and the debate between
them are certainly not about liberal values but realist interests.
Second, the realist perspective will better analyse the game of national
interests among the member states in the European Union. Despite the lib-
eral slogans about the community of interests the difference of national in-
terests has always accompanied the history of the European integration
and remains a specific feature of this process today. The recent difficulties
of the European Union with the common and co-ordinated reaction to the
Russian-Ukrainian conflict seem to illustrate this game clearly (Waterfield,
Freeman, 2014). Besides, the problems with the European Union’s re-
sponse to the Russian-Georgian and the Russian-Ukrainian conflicts con-
firm the previous Morgenthau’s conclusion about the limited ability of
the liberal powers to timely and adequately react to external threats
(Morgenthau, 1947, p. 65–66; Williams, 2005, p. 103).
The liberals are right when they indicate that the process of the Euro-
pean integration has profoundly changed the political environment in Eu-
rope. Even some (classical and neoclassical) realists would emphasize that
it considerably mitigated and tamed the struggle for power on the conti-
nent. It has reduced the potential of conflict and transformed the political
rivalry in Europe into more peaceful and more consensual forms. For real-
ism, however, the European integration is still a story about interests and
a difference of interest and not about a liberal harmony of interest (Don-
nelly, 2000, p. 194). The potential of conflict in the European community
still exists and the gradual fall of the European integration mechanisms
may reveal more brutal aspects of international relations on the continent.
Third, the membership in the European Union does not automatically
eliminate the previous socio-political problems in East-Central Europe, to
include those with the post-communist identities and illiberal attitudes
among the people and politicians. Milada Anna Vachudova and Alina
Mungiu-Pippidi underline in this regard that the membership has consid-
erably promoted pro-liberal and pro-democratic changes in social atti-
tudes in the region. It has improved the quality of political competition as
well. Nevertheless, it has not automatically changed the problems with il-
liberal practices of East-Central European elites. Similarly the massive
legislation that has formally been accepted in the frame of the acquis
communautaire does not necessarily improve the everyday work of East-
-Central European bureaucracy (Vachudova, 2010, p. 82–83, 102–104;
Pippidi, 2010, p. 59–62, 71–76).
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Considering the example of the European Union the critical theorists
and the postmodernists, for their part, would emphasize the hidden inter-
ests behind the integration process that the official politics do not refer to
(Rupert, 2010, p. 158–159; Devetak, 2005, p. 167–170, 176–182). They
would notice that the Eastern enlargement of the European Union serves
mainly the interests of the leading economic companies of the Western
Europe and helps them to dominate the markets of the new members. The
earlier collapse of the largest communist period industrial plants and the
liberal slogans about the freedom of entrepreneurship promoted by the Eu-
ropean Union make this expansion easier. They would point out the even
some of the EU structural funds granted to the new member states come
back to the Western European companies. They are much stronger and
more competitive than the firms from East-Central Europe and are in
a better position to win the public tenders. Some examples of grand
infrastructural project in the region illustrate it clearly (Cienski, 2010).
The critical theorists and the postmodernists would emphasize that
some of the democratic mechanisms in the new members of the European
Union remain declarative and formal but not necessarily efficient. They
would indicate a relatively short period of a more in-depth conditionality
and control of the EU over the democratic transformation in the candidate
countries. This conditionality has practically ceased after the enlargement.
Hence, the postmodernists and the critical theorists would claim that weak
and façade institutions of East-Central Europe will not be able to eradicate
the problems inherited from the communist past, to include the corruption,
political clientelism or disrespect for the law by some interest groups.
Finally they would point out that the decision about the Eastern enlarge-
ment of the European Union, if taken not by the Western politicians but by
the Western societies in referendums, would probably be negative for this
enlargement and the accession of the new members at all. All of this,
again, illustrates the limited ability of liberalism to analyse the complex is-
sues of contemporary international affairs alone and the need of the more
comprehensive attitude reaching beyond the liberal confines.
Conclusion
The fall of the bipolar order marked the prestigious victory of liberal-
ism in the previous inter-paradigmatic debate. Nevertheless the dynamic
evolution of international relations after the end of the cold war contrib-
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utes to the growing gap between the liberal rhetoric and the socio-political
reality of contemporary international affairs. Liberalism remains the lead-
ing explanatory perspective of today’s world yet the full and adequate pic-
ture of contemporary international relations becomes impossible without
the supplementary contribution of some realist, constructivist or even
postmodernist conclusions. The liberal analysis, if considered alone, will
be incomplete and may be misleading. This becomes true in the case of do-
mestic political processes, to include the democratic transformation of
East-Central Europe, as well as the political and economic aspects of con-
temporary international affairs.
The example of the countries in East-Central Europe contributes to
those theses. The analysis of the socio-political reality of the region, and
especially the game between the “new” liberal and the “old” commu-
nist-rooted patterns of social activity, reaches beyond the liberal frames.
The popular reactions to liberalism in the region are mixed and the liberal
values are often misconceived or misunderstood. Liberal dynamism and
creativity, shared by some segments of East-Central European societies,
still meet communist-rooted passivity, demanding attitudes and populism.
Besides, liberal rhetoric serves to justify illiberal practices and limited ef-
fectiveness of East-Central European political elites, and liberalism tends
to fall into dogmatism. It misses the dynamic changes in the social and po-
litical reality of the region, to include the growing populism. Thus, the full
picture of the East-Central European democratic transformation will be
incomplete without some strong realist, constructivist or critical theoreti-
cal conclusions.
In the same vein, liberalism remains the important perspective to study
the Eastern enlargement of the European Union and the contemporary Eu-
ropean integration. It tends, however, to miss some power-oriented as-
pects of the relations between the old and the new members as well as the
game of national interests inside the EU. Some realist and postmodernist
conclusions, or those coming from the critical theory, could help to reveal
the complexity of the European integration after the accession of the new
members from East-Central Europe.
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RozdŸwiêk pomiêdzy liberaln¹ retoryk¹ a spo³eczno-polityczn¹
rzeczywistoœci¹ wspó³czesnych stosunków miêdzynarodowych
– przyk³ad Europy Œrodkowo-Wschodniej
Streszczenie
Niniejszy artyku³ dotyczy rozdŸwiêku pomiêdzy liberaln¹ retoryk¹ a spo³ecz-
no-polityczn¹ rzeczywistoœci¹ wspó³czesnych stosunków miêdzynarodowych. Autor
twierdzi, ¿e jakkolwiek liberalizm nadal zapewnia wiod¹c¹ perspektywê eksplana-
cyjn¹, wspó³czesne stosunki miêdzynarodowe s¹ zbyt dynamiczne i skomplikowane
aby mo¿na by³o zanalizowaæ je wy³¹cznie w ramach liberalizmu, który zreszt¹ popada
w dogmatyzm. Z tego powodu, adekwatna analiza wspó³czesnej demokracji oraz poli-
tycznych i gospodarczych aspektów wspó³czesnych stosunków miêdzynarodowych
jest niepe³na, jeœli nie uwzglêdnia pewnych wniosków ze sfery realizmu, konstrukty-
wizmu, a nawet postmodernizmu. Przyk³ad transformacji demokratycznej w Europie
Œrodkowo-Wschodniej doskonale obrazuje tê tezê. Liberalne reformy w regionie
wci¹¿ zderzaj¹ siê z rygorystycznymi pogl¹dami wywodz¹cymi siê z socjalistycznej
przesz³oœci. Liberalne wartoœci s¹ poza tym zniekszta³cane i b³êdnie pojmowane. Wy-
jaœnianie tych procesów wykracza daleko poza liberalizm i analiza nawet samego
wschodniego poszerzenia Unii Europejskiej by³aby bardziej wyczerpuj¹ca gdyby
uwzglêdni³a pewne odniesienia do realizmu, krytyki teoretycznej czy postmodernizmu.
S³owa kluczowe: liberalizm, demokracja, stosunki miêdzynarodowe, Europa Œrodko-
wo-Wschodnia, Unia Europejska
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